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ABSTRACT
The introduction of vertical coordination in the hog industry has provided producers with
new business arrangements for raising hogs. While some researchers have elicited utility
functions for hog producers on the basis of income risk, none have addressed autonomy,
a factor which appears to be important in business arrangement selection for independent
family hog operations. In this study, a method is developed for eliciting a multi-attribute
function with attributes of income and autonomy. Utility functions are elicited for a group
of Minnesota farrow-to-finish hog producers. For these producers, autonomy dominated
risk as the most important attribute in business arrangement selection.
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The U.S. pork industry is rapidly undergoing
structural changes that are affecting the man-
ner in which hog producers are conducting
business. As discussed by Kliebenstein and
Lawrence, and by Hurt, one of these changes
is an increase in the number of contracts be-
tween hog producers and vertical coordina-
tors—which include feed companies and
packers. While these contracts differ as to
ownership provisions and management re-
sponsibilities, it is commonly argued that
some independent producers will shift to con-
tract production because it reduces income
risk, while others will not do so because of the
reduced opportunity to control the operation.
This analysis presents a multi-attribute deci-
sion framework for estimating the relative im-
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portance of risk and other factors in the con-
tracting decision.
In their recent study, Kliebenstein and
Lawrence state that the primary reason for
contractual arrangements in the hog industry
is risk reduction. A number of studies have
been conducted predicting hog producers’
preferences for contracts on the basis of in-
come risk (e.g., Lawrence and Kaylen; John-
son and Foster). Results of these investigations
suggest that some contracts should be attrac-
tive to risk-averse producers, depending upon
their levels of risk aversion. This is because
there is a risk/expected-return tradeoff in-
volved in hog production contracts. While the
risk argument partly explains why a producer
might accept a contract, it is somewhat unsat-
isfactory given the resistance that contractors
have faced in some of the traditional hog pro-
duction regions of the U.S. If risk is the pri-
mary factor affecting contracting decisions,
why have relatively few independent produc-
ers in these regions contracted? And why have176 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
many lobbied for legislation that would outlaw
these business practices (Hamilton and An-
drews)?
We hypothesize that these producers’ value
of autonomy is sufficiently large to offset the
risk-reducing benefits of contracts and that in-
come risk is not the dominant factor in many
producers’ contracting decisions. Multi-attri-
bute analysis allows for investigation into the
tradeoff between risk and autonomy. Although
the presence of attributes other than risk is dis-
cussed by Fulton and Gillespie in the context
of joint-ownership hog farms, their descriptive
model provides no measures of the importance
of attributes. Other researchers have quantified
agricultural decisions in multi-attribute frame-
works (e.g., Foltz et al.; Patrick, Blake, and
Whitaker); however, contracts have not been
assessed under such a framework.
While income risk is reduced with many
contracts, other associated advantages with
contract production include the following
when comparing independent and contract
production units producing approximately the
same number of hogs per year: (a) less oper-
ating capital is required for a contracted than
for an independent producer to begin produc-
tion since, in most cases, the contractor fur-
nishes breeding stock and variable inputs; (b)
some lending institutions loan money only to
contract producers for operating capital or fa-
cilities; and (c) the producer may prefer shar-
ing management responsibilities with the con-
tractor. The contract producer also faces the
following disadvantages: (a) moral hazard
may result in conflicting incentives of contract
provisions, (b) the contract may be broken or
not renewed by the contractor, (c) the producer
may not prefer sharing management respon-
sibilities with a contractor, and (d) the pro-
ducer may be concerned about the possibility
of future contractor market power.
In this study, the independent producer’s
preference function for alternative production
arrangements is modeled as a multi-attribute
decision problem composed of the attributes
of income and producer autonomy (autono-
my). Autonomy represents the desirability of
a business arrangement on the basis of how
business structure and lifestyle aspects other
than income and variability of incomel are af-
fected. Attributes other than income are com-
bined into a single attribute, allowing for de-
termination of the relative importance of
income risk versus other attributes in produc-
ers’ contracting decisions.
The objectives of this study are to: (a) de-
velop a methodology to estimate a measure of
producer autonomy preference for alternative
contractual arrangements, (b) estimate utility
functions for money income and measure how
the desire for producer autonomy determines
producers’ preferences for business arrange-
ments, and (c) determine the relative impor-
tance of income risk and autonomy in a group
of producers’ business arrangement prefer-
ences.
Methods
The six steps taken to fulfill the study objec-
tives are summarized in table 1. In the follow-
ing discussion we describe each of these steps
in greater detail.
Business Arrangements and Net Returns
Distributions
Six business arrangements represent the array
currently offered to farrow-to-finish producers.
Table 2 presents these arrangements in order
of the highest level of autonomy and income
risk (independent production) to the lowest
level (vertical integration).
Net returns distributions were computed
for arrangements from actual efficiency fac-
tors, costs, and returns of representative far-
row-to-finish producers in the Southwestern
Minnesota Farm Business Management As-
sociation (SMFBMA). Farms with a consistent
number of sows per year represented the three
size classes of 60-, 130-, and 300-sow opera-
tions. Criteria suggesting farms were well
managed included sow productivity, feed ef-
ficiency, weans per litter, and death loss. Five
years of production and price data (1986–90)
1In this study, “income” is defined as net returns
and is the return to labor and management when it is
discussed in relation to the decision maker’s utility.Gillespie and Eidman: Risk, Autonomy, and Contracting Among Hog Producers 177
Table 1. Summary of Methods Used in Eliciting Hog Producer’s Preference Functions








Calculate net returns distributions.
Determine whether income and au-
tonomy are mutually additive in-
dependent.
Elicit producer’s preferences for in-
come. Estimate utility functions.
Elicit producers’ preferences for au-
tonomy and its subattributes.
Determine the relative importance
of risk versus autonomy.
Discussion with industry leaders and vertical coordinating
firms; review industry magazines.
Distributions computed for arrangements from efficiency fac-
tors, costs, and returns of actual farms. Returns include price
and production risk.
Personal producer interview developed to determine whether
income is additive independent of autonomy, and whether
autonomy is additive independent of income. Methods de-
veloped according to Keeney and Raiffa.
Ramsey method used to elicit income preferences via personal
interview. SCAR functional form and error-in-response mod-
el used to estimate utility functions.
Decision tree approach used to compare net returns distribu-
tions for alternative business arrangements and independent
production via personal interview. Contract premium is de-
termined. Autonomy premium is calculated from contract
premium and risk premium. Subattributes of autonomy are
assessed.
Size of autonomy premium and size of risk premium are com-
pared between independent production and all other business
arrangements.
were used to calculate annual net returns to
labor and management for business arrange-
ments in each size class, allowing for incor-
poration of price and production risk (table 3).
Returns were calculated using contract for-
mulas and prices received by the top 20% of
SMFBMA producers, Price risk is assumed to
be reduced by the alternative arrangements.
Fixed capital requirements are assumed to be
equal for all arrangements except for vertical
integration. With contracts, hogs, feed, and
other variable inputs are owned by the con-
tractor. The 1986–90 time frame represents a
hog cycle period representative of prices that
producers expected to receive when prefer-
ences were elicited (i.e., during winter 1992–
93).
Assessing the Assumption of Mutual Additive
Independence
Investigation of additive independence allows
for the determination of the appropriate form
of a multi-attribute function. Keeney and Raif-
fa describe additive independence as holding
when “the paired preference comparison of
any two lotteries, defined by two joint proba-
bility distributions on Y X Z, depends only on
their marginal probabilityy distributions” (p.
230). Thus, with additive independence, (1)
holds:
(1) U(Y, Z) = kyur(y) + kzuz(.z),
where u(y, z) represents the multi-atttibute
utility function with attributes Y and Z and
weights kj. With additive independence, auton-
omy and income risk preferences are elicited
separately, reducing the hypothetical nature of
subsequent elicitation questioning.
A personal producer interview was used to
test whether income preference was indepen-
dent of autonomy preference. For each of four
business arrangements, certainty equivalents
were elicited assuming three different net re-
turns distributions. A decision tree method
was employed. For each distribution, if the
certainty equivalents were equal for all ar-178 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
Table 2. Business Arrangements Examined in the Analysis, Listed from Highest to Lowest
Levels of Risk and Autonomy
Business Arrangement Provisions
Independent Production The producer owns all inputs and determines when and where
to market hogs (traditional production arrangement).
Cost-Plus Marketing Agreement Independent producers contract for a risk-reducing price ahead
of time. The producer uses a contractor-designed feed pro-
gram and purchases the non-feedgrain portion of feed from
the contractor. The producer may purchase breeding stock
from the contractor.
Contract w/Incentive Payments The contractor provides variable inputs, breeding stock, feed,
other services such as vet and medicine, technical expertise,
and transportation, and manages the operation, Producer pro-
vides facilities, utilities and fuel, and labor. Producer receives
payment per cwt plus feed efficiency, sow productivity, and
market weight incentive payment.
Contract w/No Incentive Payments Same as the contract with incentive payments, except no in-
centive payments for feed efficiency, sow productivity, and
market weight.
Contract w/Neighbor This is a contract with no incentive payments, except that the
contract is with another local producer instead of a large
corporation.
Vertical Integration Used in Quebec, this is an arrangement where integrators own
all operations from production to processing. In this study
the producer is assumed to sell facilities and manage the unit
for a predetermined salary.




cost-Plus Contract Intent. Payments;
Measures Independent Marketing w/Intent. Contract WI
(by operation size) Production Agreement Payments Neighbor
60-SOW (initial mean’ = $10,722)
Std. Dev. 13,350 7,467 6,124 2,130
Skewnessb 0.406 –0.223 0.827 –0.577
130-SOW (initial mean’ = $33,811)
Std. Dev. 52,327 33,315 15,671 8,841
Skewnessh 1.184 2.028 0.467 1.291
300-SOW (initial mean’ = $46,238)
Std. Dev. 71,846 33,826 20,605 20,931
Skewnessh –0.441 1,474 –0.548 –0.562
‘ Denotes initial mean used in CP excitation.
hDenotes Pearson measure of skewness.Gillespie and Eidman: Risk, Autonomy, and Contracting Among Hog Producers 179
rangements, then income was judged to be ad-
ditive independent of autonomy.z
The respondent was then asked to rank four
business arrangements from most to least pre-
ferred, assuming all shared the same net re-
turns distribution. The process was repeated
using two other distributions. If business ar-
rangements were ranked the same under each
distribution, autonomy was judged to be ad-
ditive independent of income.
Assuming that additive independence
holds, relationship (2) will hold:3
(2) CP = CRP + AP,
where CP is the contract premium, CRP is the
comparative risk premium, and AP is the au-
tonomy premium. The CP is the amount of
money the producer is willing to pay or accept
to remain as an independent producer, as op-
posed to accepting an alternative business ar-
rangement (ABA). The CRP is the difference
between the certainty equivalent of indepen-
dent production and the certainty equivalent of
an ABA. The AP is the amount of money the
producer is willing to pay or accept to retain
his or her autonomy level.
Elicitation of Preferences for Income and
Estimation of Utility of Income
The CRP may be determined through elicita-
tion of preferences and estimation of utility of
2This is a method that may be used to test for
utility independence, as discussed by Keeney and Raif-
fa. However, in our case, autonomy is assumed to be
deterministic. Since autonomy is deterministic, utility
independence is necessary and sufficient for additive
independence. Thus, we use this technique to test for
additive independence. (See Keeney and Raiffa for fur-
ther details.)
~Assuming that additive independence holds, a
proposition by Varian allows (2) to be mapped to (l):
“Suppose preferences are complete, reflexive, transi-
tive, continuous, and strongly monotonic. Then there
exists a continuous utility function, u: 81! + !Yl,which
represents those preferences” (p. 112). We assume
preferences for income (leading to the calculation of
the CRP) and preferences for autonomy (leading to the
calculation of the AP) meet these assumptions. There-
fore, utility functions exist for both, and can be rep-
resented as (1).
income, which assumes the expected utility
hypothesis holds.4 For this analysis, individu-
als’ risk preferences were elicited using the
Ramsey approach because it has been found
to be relatively easy for producers to under-
stand and thus yields consistent choices (Of-
ficer and Halter; Knowles), Using the Ramsey
approach, there are two lotteries, both with
two equally probable outcomes—the first lot-
tery with incomes Xli and Xzi, and the second
with income X3,and a non-prespecified income
~,. In a series of n lottery iterations, co, are
elicited that render the decision maker indif-
ferent among the various sets of lotteries. The
ranges of incomes elicited here using the Ram-
sey approach were $0 to $40,000 for 60- and
130-sow producers, and $0 to $80,000 for
300-sow producers.
The functional form selected for utility of
income U(I) is the sum of constant absolute
risk aversion (SCAR) function, specified in
(3):
(3) U(Z) = –ehll – ~eAll,
where Al is the upper bound on absolute risk
aversion, h2 is the lower bound, and (3 is a
weighting parameter. SCAR allows for con-
stant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. Pre-
vious comparisons of functional forms reveal
that SCAR results in the best fit of several
alternative functional forms (Keeney and Raif-
fa; Knowles).5 (See the appendix for a discus-
sion of estimation combining the SCAR func-
tion with the error-in-response model.)
Derivation of the Autonomy Premium and
Assessing the Subattributes of Autonomy
Business arrangements may be ordered ac-
cording to autonomy level, but no prescribed
4Though its axioms have been challenged (Machi-
na), expected utility arguably remains the best avail-
able tool for analyzing risk preferences (Robison and
Barry, p. 20). Elicitation and econometrics methods
have been developed and refined which reduce axiom
violations and bias (e.g., Spetzler and Stael von Hol-
stein; Knowles).
5The SCAR function has not been compared to
Saha’s flexible expo-power function.180 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
cardinal measure is associated with autonomy.
Thus, utility indexing is not useful forauton-
omy. As a composite attribute, three subattri-
bute categories for autonomy are those which
(a) include moral hazard between contractor
and contracted, such as the risk of contract de-
fault; (b) affect management style; and (c) af-
fect input quality and usage. In this study, sub-
attributes are aggregated into one attribute—
autonomy.
Elicitation of the CP allows for calculation
of the AP through equation (2). The CP is es-
timated using contingent valuation techniques.
The producer is presented with two business
arrangements-independent production and an
ABA, Both arrangements are assumed to have
equal expected net returns to labor and man-
agement .CThe producer then examines provi-
sions and net returns distributions of the ABA
and independent production, and determines
which to accept at the given expected net re-
turns level. Provisions include specifications
for input use, including labor, and pricing. By
adding or subtracting constants to each ele-
ment of the ABA distribution and utilizing a
decision tree approach (Anderson, Dillon, and
Hardaker), a distribution is discovered that
makes the producer indifferent between the
ABA and independent production. Thus, as-
suming iY[E(Z~~~)]= U[E(Z,P)], where E(Z1) is
the expected income indifference level for ar-
rangement 1, the CP are determined using (4):
(4) CP = E(Z.B.) – E(Z,F).
The corresponding AP are acquired through
(2). The decision tree approach is used to
avoid asking the abstract question, “How
much would I have to offer you to accept the
alternative arrangement?” Information bias is
minimized by carefully describing each ar-
rangement. Hypothetical bias is not considered
problematic since most producers are familiar
with the provisions and have considered con-
tracts.
GExpected net returns are generally lower for con-
tracts; however, constants are added to the net returns
distributions of contracts so that expected net returns
are equal for each arrangement at the onset. This is
necessary for elicitation of contract premia.
Elicitation of preferences was conducted
during winter 1992–93, a period when prices
were at the lower bound of the previous 10-
year period, but consistent with hog cycle ex-
pectations. Thus, we do not believe that con-
tracts would be significantly more or less at-
tractive to producers due to economic
conditions during this period.
A follow-up mail survey was utilized to de-
termine the importance of the subattributes of
autonomy. Subatttibutes (listed in table 4)
were identified from the literature (e.g., Zering
and Beals; Kliebenstein and Hillburn), and in-
cluded those which contained moral hazard,
affected input usage, and affected manage-
ment style. In the mail survey, statements were
made about contracts. Using a scale from 1–7
(see table 4 footnote), the producer was asked
to rank his or her reaction to each statement.
Results
Results of the Additive Independence
Interview
Fourteen farrow-to-finish producers whose op-
erations ranged in size from 50 to 250 sows
were interviewed to determine whether inde-
pendence properties held. Rvelve of the 14
producers provided certainty equivalents con-
sistent with the assumption that income was
additive independent of autonomy. Equal cer-
tainty equivalents were chosen by eight pro-
ducers, while four chose certainty equivalents
that were within $2,000 of one another. In
these “close” cases, income was judged to be
weakly additive independent of autonomy.7 In-
come was not additive independent of auton-
omy for two producers.
In determining whether autonomy was ad-
ditive independent of income, eight of 11 pro-
ducers chose the same rankings of business
arrangements when expected income was in-
creased from $21,917 to $75,833. Six of the
14 did not rank business arrangements the
same when two distributions of equal expected
7Final limbs of the decision tree are set at $2,000
increments. It is assumed that a subject could easily
respond with an error in response of $2,000.Gillespie and Eidman: Risk, Autonomy, and Contracting Among Hog Producers






The contract may be broken with a three-month notice by either party. 3.18
I can receive a loan from the contractor to build new facilities.
I share management responsibilities with the contractor,
The contractor determines the type of feed to be used.
The contractor determines quality and usage of variable inputs (feed,
medical supplies).
The contractor determines when to place and remove hogs.
The contractor determines how many hogs will be in the facilities.
Some local hog buyers may close if area farmers begin contracting.










A fieldman visits the farm weekly to monitor the operation and advise the farmer, 4,47
Note: Based on follow-up mail survey responses provided by 17 of the 20 producers comprising the study sample.
aThe 1–7 ranking scale is defined as follows: 1 = this factor would prevent me from contracting, 2 = this factor would
be a very negative aspect of contracting, 3 = this factor would be a slightly negative aspect of contracting, 4 = this
factor would not affect my decision whether or not to contract, 5 = this factor would be a slightly positive aspect of
contracting, 6 = this factor would be a very positive aspect of contracting, and 7 = this factor would cause me to
contract.
income but different variance were compared.
However, of the six, three believed they could
increase the probability of attaining the upper
income levels in the widely dispersed distri-
bution, indicating they misunderstood the
questioning. Consequently, these results were
judged “not applicable.” The three remaining
producers stated if they were going to make a
stable income, they would work in a factory.
They selected a contract as first choice with
the narrowly dispersed distribution, and 1P as
first choice with the widely dispersed distri-
bution. For those producers, autonomy pref-
erence depended upon income.
While most multi-attribute utility analyses
assume additive independence without testing,
these results lead us to assume that additive
independence will hold in the majority of
cases and be a limiting assumption in a few
cases, thus allowing for the elicitation of the
CRP and AP separately.
Risk Preference Elicitation Results
Table 5 presents results of the SCAR with er-
ror-in-response model estimations derived
from responses by six 60-sow, twelve 130-
SOW, and two 300-sow operators.8 Monetary
outcomes are divided by 1,000 in preparing
estimates, facilitating estimation of the small
parameter values for hl and AZ.Results shown
in table 5 indicate that all of the surveyed pro-
ducers are risk averse. An observation was
made that some producers’ certainty equiva-
lents for independent production were nega-
tive using the SCAR model. In the sensitivity
analysis, we examine results of the constant
absolute risk aversion (CAR) function, which
is estimated as SCAR but assumes that (3 = O.
Negative certainty equivalents for independent
production were not found using CAR.
8This distribution of hog farm sizes is consistent
with the distribution of hog farm sizes in Minnesota in
the early 1990s. The relatively small producers could
remain the same size and enter into cost-plus market-
ing agreements and contracts with neighboring pro-
ducers. In order to contract with a vertical integrator,
most of the small operators would require expansion.
However, questions for the CP interview for contracts
with vertical integrators assumed the producer could
remain the same size. This allowed for determination
of the attractiveness of these types of business arrange-
ments to small producers and conclusions that could
be drawn as to the attractiveness of contracts to exist-
ing producers.182 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
Table 5. Estimates of the SCAR Function (Al
and h, divided by 1,000)
Farm












































































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Contract Premium Elicitation Results
The contingent valuation CP elicitation posed
surprisingly little difficulty for producers. We
believe the reason for this is twofold. First,
producers are familiar with independent pro-
duction and its associated net returns distri-
bution, and they accepted as a reasonable rep-
resentation the provided distribution; and
second, most producers are familiar with pro-
visions of many of the ABAs. The realistic
nature of the choices allowed most producers
to examine provisions and give careful
thought to their answers. Results of the CP
elicitation are summarized in table 6. We re-
port the average CP for each ABA. A negative
CP indicates that the producer prefers the
ABA over independent production, whereas a
positive CP signifies that the producer prefers
independent production over the ABA. Since
neither of the two 300-sow producers in the
study chose contracts, this producer group is
not shown in table 6.
As indicated by the “CP YO Increase” row
in table 6, the six 60-SOW producers report
they would require more than double their cur-
rent expected income from hog production in
order to accept ABAs; each alternative ar-
rangement shows an increase of over 100Yo.
The cost-plus marketing arrangement and the
contract with a neighbor would require 139%
and 120’%0 higher net returns, respectively.
However, because there were only six 60-SOW
operators in the study, the averages are dra-
matically influenced by one individual whose
CPS were much higher than the others. With-
out this producer’s results, the percentage in-
crease for the three arrangements with the
lowest CPS would drop to 70%.
The highest CP average for the twelve 130-
sow producers is associated with vertical in-
tegration (table 6). Relinquishing all indepen-
dence through vertical integration is
unattractive to the producers since they are be-
coming employees of the company. The CPS
for the remaining arrangements are very close,
ranging from $5,417 to $6,146. These results
suggest that, on average, producers would re-
quire an expected net return increase of 16–
19’% to enter into an alternative contractual ar-Gillespie and Eidman: Risk, Autonomy, and Contracting Among Hog Producers 183
Table 6. Contract Premia (CP) and Autonomy Premia (AP) for Alternative Business Arrange-
ments
Alternative Business Arrangements
Contract WI Contract WI cost-Plus
Measures No Intent. Intent. Marketing Vertically Contract WI





CP No. (–) / (m)
AP Average ($)
AP Median ($)





CP No. (–) / (cO)
AP Average ($)
AP Median ($)



















Average, All Sizes (20 producers)
CP Average ($) 11,134




















rangement, or 4670 to vertically integrate. Not
surprisingly, most 130-SOW producers report
similar CPS across the board because arrange-
ments with lower autonomy levels also have
less associated income risk. This tradeoff par-
tially explains why the cost-plus marketing
agreement does not have a lower associated
CR Also, most producers agree that the re-
quirement of the cost-plus marketing agree-
ment to buy breeding stock and feed from the
integrator and sell hogs to the integrator’s
specifications is only slightly more attractive
than other contracts.
Over all size categories, five of the 20 pro-
ducers (all of whom are 130-sow operators)


























































accept contracts if the expected income were
equal to independent production. The unwill-
ingness of the 60-SOW operators to accept
ABAs is not surprising for three reasons. First,
most realize they would have to expand their
operation sizes in order to enter into a con-
tract. Second, they are typically more diver-
sified than the larger operations; thus these
producers realize they would have to reduce
labor in another enterprise in order to contract
with a larger herd. Third, because the
SMFBMA 60-SOW operators’ production effi-
ciencies are not as high as those of larger pro-
ducers in the association, the change to a con-
tract would require greater managerial
attention.184 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
Table 7. Autonomy Shares for Alternative Business Arrangements
Alternative Business Arrangements
Contract WI Contract w/ cost-Plus
Autonomy Share No Intent. Intent. Marketing Vertically Contract WI

























































The AP quantifies the attractiveness of the in-
dependent production autonomy level as com-
pared to the ABA. For 60-SOW operators, the
average AP is highest for vertically integrat-
ing, at $33,597 (table 6). The contract with
incentive payments is slightly lower
($3 1,427), followed by the contract with no
incentive payments ($29,952). The lowest av-
erage APs are for the cost-plus marketing
agreement and the contract with a neighbor,
which are 63% and 65% the size of the av-
erage AP for the contract with incentive pay-
ments, respectively. The cost-plus marketing
agreement provides managerial flexibility,
while a contract with a neighbor is more ac-
ceptable since reputation in the community is
an important factor which may encourage con-
tract compliance.
The cost-plus marketing agreement also
has the lowest average AP for 130-sow oper-
ators, at $42,759, while the AP for vertically
integrating is highest, at $59,120 (table 6).
Contracting with a neighbor is slightly more
attractive to producers than the contract with
no incentive payments, even though both
share the same income distribution.
Across all farm sizes, no producers provide
results indicating negative AF?While results of
the CP elicitation show that five producers
would accept an ABA, without the advantages
of risk reduction, none would consider this op-
tion due to other provision arrangements.
Autonomy Share
The autonomy share indicates the relative in-
fluence of the two attributes on the producers’
decisions (table 7). It is calculated as shown
by equation (5):
(5) Autonomy Share
= Abs(AP) : [Abs(AP) + Abs(CRP)],
where Abs(. ) denotes absolute value, which is
used to determine the magnitude of both AP
and CRP since they are opposite in sign for
risk-averse individuals.
Results for 60-SOW producers indicate that
autonomy is the dominant attribute in the con-
tracting decision. On average, the autonomy
share is 71 YOto 81 $ZO across arrangements for
60-SOW producers. However, for 130-SOW pro-
ducers, the autonomy share is lower, with av-
erages ranging from 51 $ZO to 56Y0. When av-Gillespie and Eidman: Risk, Autonomy, and Contracting Among Hog Producers 185
Table 8. Business Arrangement Choice Under Utility of Income versus Choice Under Utility
of Income Plus Autonomy Premium
Chosen Arrangement
Utility Income Maximization
Farm No. Utility Income Maximization + Autonomy The Same?
60-SOW Operation
1 Cost-Plus Mktg. Indep. Prodn. N
4 Indep. Prodn. Indep. Prodn. Y
6 Indep. Prodn. Indep. Prodn. Y
9 Indep. Prodn. Indep. Prodn. Y
13 Cost-Plus Mktg. Indep. Prodn. N
16 Cost-Plus Mktg. Indep. Prodn. N
130-SOW Operation
2 Cost-Plus Mktg. Cost-Plus Mktg. Y
3 Cost-Plus Mktg. Cost-Plus Mktg. Y
8 Cost-Plus Mktg. Indep. Prodn. N
10 Cost-Plus Mktg. Cost-Plus Mktg. Y
11 Cost-Plus Mktg. Indep. Prodn. N
12 Cost-Plus Mktg. Cost-Plus Mktg. Y
14 Cost-Plus Mktg. Indep. Prodn. N
15 Cost-Plus Mktg. Cost-Plus Mktg. Y
17 Cost-Plus Mktg. Indep. Prodn. N
18 Cost-Plus Mktg. Indep. Prodn. N
19 Cost-Plus Mktg. Indep. Prodn. N
20 Cost-Plus Mktg. Indep. Prodn. N
300-SOW Operation
5 Contract w/Intent. Indep. Prodn. N
7 Contract wfincent. Indep. Prodn. N
eraging across all farm sizes, the autonomy
share ranges from 58’% to 64?10.
Contract Choice with Utility of Income
versus Utility of Income Plus Autonomy
Maximization of utility of money income is
the rule typically used to assess the effect of
income risk on producers’ decisions among
risky alternatives. How does inclusion of au-
tonomy affect results regarding contract
choice? Table 8 presents a listing of the pro-
ducers’ business arrangement choice that max-
imizes utility of money income and the choice
that maximizes utility of money income and
autonomy. Results indicate that business ar-
rangement selection differs greatly between
the two decision rules. With maximization of
utility of income, 17 of the 20 producers chose
an ABA. However, with autonomy included,
only five of the 20 accepted an ABA. Of the
12 producers whose arrangement selection
changed when autonomy was considered, all
switched from independent production to ei-
ther the cost-plus marketing agreement or the
contract with incentive payments. Their APs
were positive and large enough to offset risk-
reduction advantages of ABAs. Inclusion of
autonomy altered arrangement selection for 12
of the 20 producers.
Sensitivity of Results
A sensitivity analysis on risk preference is
conducted by (a) varying the estimated param-
eters (Al and Az) by their standard errors, and
(b) estimating utility functions using the CAR
form. As shown at the bottom of table 7, re-
sults of the high risk-aversion scenario (h, and
h2 plus their standard errors) indicate the av-
erage autonomy share ranges from 58% to
63Y0, while results of the low risk-aversion186 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
scenario reflect a range from 629Z0to 68?40.
These findings show that autonomy dominates
income risk under both scenarios. Using the
CAR function, autonomy share ranges from
64% to 70%. Only positive certainty equiva-
lents result when using the CAR function and
the low risk-aversion scenario.
Subattributes of Autonomy
Which subattributes of autonomy were most
important to the surveyed producers? Follow-
up mail survey forms were returned by 17 of
the 20 producers whose preferences were elic-
ited. (Results of the survey are shown in table
4.) Of those who responded, five were 60-sow,
10 were 130-sow, and two were 300-sow pro-
ducers. The subattfibute statement receiving
the highest average ranking by producers was
“I can receive a loan from the contractor to
build new facilities. ” This statement was
ranked at 5 on the 1–7 scale, denoting that
producers considered this to be a slightly pos-
itive factor of contracting. Producers’ con-
tracting decisions were not influenced by two
subattribute statements, both of which offered
management expertise: “I share management
responsibilities with the contractor, ” and “a
fieldman visits the farm weekly to monitor the
operation and advise the farmer. ”
Subattributes containing moral hazard and
affecting input usage were perceived as slight-
ly negative aspects of contracting. These in-
cluded: “the contract may be broken with a
three-month notice by either party,” “the
contractor determines the type of feed to be
used, ” “the contractor determines quality and
usage of variable inputs, ” “the contractor de-
termines when to place and remove hogs,”
“the contractor determines how many hogs
will be in the facilities, ” and “the contractor
provides and maintains ownership of breeding
stock.” The subattribute ranked by producers
as a very negative aspect of contracting was
“some local hog buyers may close if area
farmers begin contracting.” This perhaps re-
flects a fear of contracting becoming the dom-
inant business arrangement and the discontin-
uance of independent production.
Conclusions and Implications
Although economists have long recognized
the importance of risk in producers’ selections
of business arrangements, little information
has been uncovered about the importance of
risk versus other attributes that enter into the
decision. An important finding in this study is
that, while risk is an important factor in a pro-
ducer’s contracting decision, autonomy is a
very significant attribute and thus is an im-
portant consideration when predicting the suc-
cess of a business arrangement. If income
were the only attribute used to model the pro-
ducers’ contracting decisions, our results sug-
gest that attractiveness of ABAs would be
overestimated and the price required to attract
independent producers would be underesti-
mated. The producers surveyed in this study
indicate that autonomy preference dominates
risk preference in their selections of ABAs.
These results are preliminary in nature due
to the small number of producers comprising
the study sample. Nevertheless, our findings
do indicate a lack of interest in contracting by
some Upper Midwestern independent produc-
ers. At first, this appears to conflict with the
trend toward contracting in the hog industry.
However, it is expected that new entrants’
preferences may differ significantly from those
of the independent producers we surveyed.
One would expect contracts to be more attrac-
tive to new entrants due to such factors as
higher risk aversion (since they often have
lower associated net worth) and lower auton-
omy premia (since they are not accustomed to
a particular mode of production). Also, be-
cause new entrants are likely to build larger
scale facilities to capture the economies of
size, contracts sometimes offer an increased
ability to obtain capital to begin production as
well as risk reduction for larger scale, often
nondiversified operations. It is likely that most
of the expansion of contracts has been with
new entrants while independent producers
have continued to go out of business. This is
consistent with research by Gillespie and Ful-
ton who report new entrants in states without
anti-corporate farming laws and more con-
tracts, and a decrease of small, likely indepen-Gillespie and Eidman: Risk, Autonomy, and Contracting Among Hog Producers 187
dent producers. It is important to note that
these results are unlikely to hold for indepen-
dent producers in regions other than the Upper
Midwest, where contracting in other enter-
prises has been common and/or hog markets
have become thin.
There are several possibilities for future re-
search in this area. A challenge that is faced
in developing net returns distributions for
ABAs is that some ABAs require producers to
adopt new technology. The implication is that,
even though the arrangements typically split
returns between the contractor and the pro-
ducer, an increase in total profits may result.
Further research might investigate the typical
path taken by existing independent producers
who accept contracts. Do they expand signif-
icantly and adopt new technology? And if so,
how are their profits and variability of profits
affected?
Other research that could build upon this
model might conduct a similar analysis with a
larger sample of producers. Personal farmer
interviews usually lead to small sample sizes
due to the cost of interviewing. Further study
might be conducted via mail not only to in-
crease the sample size, but also to analyze re-
gional differences in attitudes. Though Gunjal
and Legault found no differences in risk pref-
erence between integrated and non-integrated
hog producers in Quebec, an investigation of
differences in autonomy preference between
these two groups would be of interest. Using
a mail survey, risk attitude might be investi-
gated using the interval approach (Wilson and
Eidman). Quantification of the effects of the
subattributes of autonomy on the size of the
autonomy premium could be analyzed. Given
the rapid evolution of the industry, results
could provide policy makers, contractors, and
academics a greater insight into how tradition-
al family hog operations likely will be affected
under the new industry structure.
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Appendix: Estimating Comparative Risk
Premia
Using the Ramsey approach, income co,is elicited
which makes the decision maker indifferent be-
tween the two lotteries, and (A 1) holds:
(Al) U(X,,) + U(X,,) = U(X,,) + U(CO,).
To prevent problems associated with chained re-
sponses with Ramsey responses, the error-in-re-
sponse model (Knowles) is used, utilizing an in-
verse utility function (A2) which follows from
(Al):
(A2) xl~ = U-’[L7(xl~) + U(x~~)+ U(x q,)1 + rk,
where r~represents the error in response.
Using ordinary least squares, b minimizes the
sum of squared residuals, as specified in (A3):
(A3) Min ~ [x,, – U-’(U(X[,; b) + U(x,,; b)
k
– u(x3k; b); b)]2.
Estimating the parameters of (A3) treats the re-
sponse as the dependent variable and associates the
error with the response. Because SCAR is not in-
vertible, an iterative Gauss-Newton procedure em-
ploying SAWETS is used to obtain parameter esti-
mates.
With resulting utility functions, Arrow-Pratt co-
efficients of absolute risk aversion R(Z) are esti-
mated at the producers’ expected income levels us-
ing (A4):
(A4) R(Z) = - U“(Z)/U’(Z),
The certainty equivalent for
estimated using (A5):
each arrangement is
(A5) U(CE,) = ~ U(xm,)/n,
m=,
where i is the business arrangement and x. denotes
the n income levels in the distribution (Keeney and
Raiffa, p. 145). Comparative risk premia are then
calculated as (A6):
(A6) CRP = CEABA– CEIP,
where CEADAand CE[P are certainty equivalents of
the ABA and independentproduction, respectively.